Of Politics and Pulpits: A first Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations by Johnson, Steffen N
Boston College Law Review
Volume 42
Issue 4 The Conflicted First Amendment: Tax
Exemptions, Religious Groups, And Political Activity
Article 5
7-1-2001
Of Politics and Pulpits: A first Amendment
Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political
Activities of Religious Organizations
Steffen N. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Religion Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A first Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the
Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C.L. Rev. 875 (2001),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol42/iss4/5
OF POLITICS AND PULPITS: A FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF IRS
RESTRICTIONS ON THE POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS
STEFFEN N. JOHNSON *
Abstract: This Article explores some of the policy justifications offered
in support of restricting the political activities of tax-exempt religious
organizations. The author begins with an overview of the scope of
current federal restrictions and then considers the contention that it is
inappropriate for religious organizations to be involved in politics from
their own standpoint. He argues that federal restrictions on the political
activities of tax-exempt religious organizations raise a fundamental
question of mission that must be resolved by each organization
according to its conscience. The author also considers restrictions front
the standpoint of public policy and constitutional law, with a focus on
tit government's interest in not. compelling taxpayers to subsidize
political speech with which they disagree, and its interest. in preserving
its ability to prevent the taking of tax deductions for contributions to
political candidates. He concludes that appropriate respect for the
values of free speech and free exercise warrants a narrowing
construction of the restrictions in certain circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
When Reverend Herbert Lusk of the Exodus Baptist Church in
Philadelphia addressed the Republican National Convention in the
sunrner of 2000, his remarks provoked a firestorm of criticism. Stand-
ing at his pulpit and speaking via satellite, Reverend Lusk told the
convention delegates and millions watching by television, "We are
supporting Governor Bush because we know he gives faith a chance."'
'0 Associate, Mayer, Brown K Platt, Chicago, Illinois; Lecturer iu Law, University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Greg Ration, David Fuller, Rick Garnet!. Christine Lainbrott
Nlichael	 Mike Paulsen, and Joint Schmidt for thought-provoking discus-
sions .ind it tsights as I pritpareil this
5mEt litorial, Keeping the Faith, WALL. ST. .J., Aug. 2, 2000, at A22.
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Some suggested that there was something unseemly about Rever-
end Lusk's statement of support for then-Governor Bush. Politics and
religion, both controversial in their own right, ought not mix—at least
not in such public ways. In an interview with Reverend Lusk, FOX
News television commentator Bill O'Reilly questioned whether the
Convention was the "right forum" for someone with the "special
status" of a minister—"You shouldn't be there at the Republican Con-
vention," he charged. 2
Others claimed that Reverend Lusk's remarks were outright ille-
gal. As pastor of a church with tax-exempt status, Reverend Lusk him-
self arguably was subject to federal restrictions on the "political cam-
paign" activity of such organizations. 3 By appearing to endorse a
candidate on behalf of his church, these critics claimed, Lusk had
crossed the line. As Reverend Barry Lynn of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State alleged in a letter to Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti, "It appears . that
Reverend Lusk has violated federal tax law by announcing that we,
meaning his church, are supporting candidate Bush."4
These responses to Reverend Lusk's remarks provide a welcome
occasion for reflecting on the purposes served by federal restrictions
on the political activities of tax-exempt charities, and in particular
churches.5
 If the Supreme Court's pronouncements are to be taken
seriously, the area involves some unusually difficult questions of bal-
ancing. On the one hand, political and religious speech lie at the core
of the expression protected by the First Amendment. 6
 As for politics,
2
 The	 Factor: Personal .Story: Preachers and Politicians (FOX News broadcast, Aug.
9, 2000) (available at 2000 MT f)331313).
3 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (1976) (stating that, to qualify as a charitable entity. an or-
ganization must "not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribut-
ing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office").
4 Seek) Maunies et al., Republican National Convention 2000: Churrh Endorsing Bush May
Be Violating Tax Law, Sr. Louis PosT-Disrxrco, Aug. 2, 2000, at Al 1.
5
 For the sake of convenience, 1 use "church" in this Article as a shorthand for all
houses of religions worship. and sometimes for all religious organizations.
5 See, e.g., Buckley v. Video, 424 U.S. I, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system ui government established by our Constitution: The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order to assure [the] unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple.'" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966) (noting the "practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the
First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental aflairs.... of course
includ]iugI disci issions of candidates").
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our nation has demonstrated a "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open," and the Supreme Court has stated that protect-
ing political speech is the "central meaning of the First Amenchnent." 8
As for religion, free exercise has often been described as our "first
freedom," and the Court has observed that "a free-speech clause
without religion would he Hamlet without the prince." 10 On the other
hand, regulation of political activities likewise protects significant
public values—preventing illicit efforts to influence policy for per-
sonal gain; for example—and the Supreme Court historically has
been quite deferential to congressional decisiontnaking in those ar-
eas." In stun, religion and politics enjoy an uneasy relationship in the
law) 2
In this Article, I explore some of the policy justifications com-
monly offered in support of restricting the political activities of tax-
exeu ►pt religious organizations. After providing a brief overview of the
scope of current federal restrictions (Part I), I consider the conten-
tion that it is inappropriate for religious organizations to be involved
in politics from their standpoint (Part II). I argue that the federal re-
strictions raise a fundamental question of mission for religious or-
ganizations, one that ultimately must be resolved by each organization
as a matter of conscience. I then consider the issue from the stand-
point of public policy and constitutional law (Part III), with a particu-
lar focus on two policy justifications for the restrictions: the govern-
7 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
8 Id. at 273; see also First.Nalional Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-80 (1978).
See, e.g., THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 'RI
THE PASSAGE or THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1980); Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious
Liberty the 'Tint fteerlont"?, 21 CAttuozo L. Rim'. 1243 (2000).
to Capitol Square Review & Advisory Rd. v. Nuncio!, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995),
n See, e.g., Regan v. Taxatiou with Representation, 401 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) ("Legisla-
tures have especially broad laiitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax stat-
utes.";; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) ("The broad discretion as to
classification possessed by a legislature in the held of taxation has long been recog-
nized.... lime pressmiption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most ex-
plicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against
pariicttiar persons and classes.").
12 In this Article, 1 address the legal issues raised when religions officials and die like
speak of politics, I have elsewhere addressed the legal issues raised when political officials
(and in particular judges) speak of religion, See Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Jiihn-
son, .Sealin Sermonelte, NoIRE DAME L. REv. 863 (1997). On that topic, see alsoTheresa
S. Collett, The King's Good Servant, But God's First: The Role of Religion in Judicial Decisionntalt-
ink 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277 (2000); Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith
and Gail Religion: Catholics Becominglustiees, 39 DEPALIL L. REV. 1047 (1990).
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meat's interest in not compelling taxpayers to subsidize political
speech with which they disagree, and its interest in preserving its abil-
ity to prevent the taking of tax deductions for contributions to politi-
cal candidates. I conclude that the former justification is a
makeweight, that the latter is more substantial, and that appropriate
respect for the values of free speech and free exercise warrants a nar-
rowing construction of the restrictions in certain circumstances,
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IRS RESTRICTIONS ON THE POLITICAL.
ACTIVITY OF TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
To qualify as a tax-exempt entity under section 501 (c) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code, a corporation must satisfy four basic re-
quirements. Satisfying these requirements not only entitles an entity
organized exclusively for charitable purposes to a tax exemption for
its own income-generating activities, but also enables those who con-
tribute to it to deduct those amounts from their own taxable in-
come." As an initial matter, such entities must be organized and op-
erated exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose, and they must not permit
their net earnings to "inure[] to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual."14
 In other words, tax-exempt entities are subject
to the "private inurement" doctrine, which bars them from distribut-
ing any profit to those who control or support them." Being organ-
ized as a "nonprofit" entity, however, does not itself establish an or-
ganization's right to tax-exempt status under Section 501(c) (3); an
organization must also serve some purpose that, in Congress's judg-
ment, is socially valuable and thus warrants exemption from taxa-
tion. 16
More important for present purposes, entities exempt under Sec-
tion 501(c) (3) are subject. to two distinct restrictions on their political
activities. 17
 First, the Code provides that "no substantial part of the [ir]
13 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3). Sec also BRUCE R. HopKINs, CHARITY, ADVOCACY. AND THE
LAW 16 (1992).
14 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3). See generally HOPKINS, supra note 13, at 130.
15 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2).
15
 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) states that to qualify for tax-exempt status, corporations must
be "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for pub-
lic safety, literary, educatiottal purposes, or to foster national or international aniateur
sports competition (hut only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic fa-
cilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals ...."
17
 In addition to restrictions inposed by i he Internal Revenue Code, tax-exempt chari-
table entities are also stil)ject to restrictions imposed by federal election law. See Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, - 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 (1999 Stipp.).
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activities" may constitute "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise at-
tempting, to influence legislation." 18 Second, such organizations must
"not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or dis-
tributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office." 19
The Internal Revenue Code thus conditions the tax-exempt
status of charities upon their willingness to comply with limitations on
their efforts to influence both legislation and eleCtions for public
office. The regulation of lobbying and that of political campaign activ-
ity, however, are distinct in scope. The Code's limitation on exempt
organizations' efforts "to influence legislation"—on "efforts to com-
municate to elected officials their moral convictions on matters of
public concern"29—pertnits them to engage in something less than a
"substantial" amount of lobbying activity. Although the meaning of
"substantial" is far from clear, Section 501(h) of the Code provides a
safe: harbor—known as the "expenditure test" 21—that (as a rule of
thumb) permits organizations that elect to report their expenditures
to the IRS to spend up to twenty percent of their gross expenses on
direct lobbying , 22 and up .to five percent of gross expenses on grass
roots lobbying, 23 without losing their exemptio11. 24 Moreover, efforts
"to influence legislation" do not include, among other things, the
provision of nonpartisan studies to public officials, communications
regarding legislation that affects the organization's existence, com-
munications with an organization's membership regarding proposed
legislation (absent direct encouragement to lobby), routine commu-
nications with governmental officials, or discussions about social and
IR 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3).
19 Id.
2° See Edward McGlynn Gaffneydn, On Not Rendering to Censor.. The Unconstitutionality of
Tax Regulation of Activities of Religion.s . Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DITAin., 1. RF.V. 1, 3
(1990).
21 Serge/rem/4 HOPKINS, SU pra note 13, § 5.6 at 181-97.
22 Direct lobbying involves communicating a specific view on "specific legislation" to
legislators. their staffs, and/or other governmental officials that participate in the formula-
tion of legislation. Treas, keg. §56.4911-2(b) (1) (ii) (1990): see also 26 U.S.G.
§ 4911 (d) (1) (13) (1976). This "includes the presentation of testimony at public hearings
held by legislative committees, correspondence and conferences with legislators and their
stalls, and publication of documents advocating specific legislative action." See LioNuNrs,
supra note 13. § 5.4 at 137-38.
23 Grass roots lobbying invtilves communicating a specific view regarding legislation to
members of the general public and urging them to take specific action regarding that
legislation. Treas. keg. § 56.4911-2(6) (2) (ii). See also E IoYKFNS, .511p0(a note 13, § 5.4 at 138.
2.1 See 26 U.S.G. §§ '191, 501 (II) (1994); Treas. keg. § 1 .501 (11)-1(a) (3) (1990). Sep gener-
limaNs, supra nine 13, §§ 5.3-5.10 at 133-228.
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political problems upon which the legislature might be expected to
acL 25
In contrast to section 501(c) (3)'s restriction on lobbying, the
Code's regulation of exempt organizations' efforts to affect "political
campaigns"—on their efforts "to persuade voters of the correctness of
moral convictions that relate to candidates for public office" 26—is ab-
solute. To be sure, there are definitional questions concerning What
constitutes "participation" or "intervention" in a "campaign for public
office" as well as who qualifies as a "candidate."27 But those activities
that come within the restriction are completely barred. Taken at face
value, organizations that wish to enjoy the benefit of tax-exempt status
may not say a word "on behalf or or "iii opposition to" a political
candidate. The statute adopts a "zero tolerance" policy, and the IRS's
regulatory interpretations of the Code are similarly restrictive. 28
Unfortunately, the formal legislative history of these provisions
sheds little light on their purpose, let alone Congress's thoughts about
their application to religious organizations. Both restrictions arose as
Senate floor amendments, and neither had the benefit of congres-
sional hearings. 29 The lobbying restriction, passed in 1934, was intro-
duced by Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania. He spoke of restricting
charitable donations "made to advance the personal interests of the
giver of the money," but conceded that his proposed amendment
went "much further than the [Committee on Finance] intended to
go."" The campaigning restriction, passed in 1954, was introduced by
then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, who was concerned about the ef-
forts of two tax-exempt charities (Facts Forum and the Committer for
Constitutional Government) that were helping to finance his oppo-
nent's election campaign." The official legislative record is virtually
25 SeellomtiNs, supra note 13, § 5.5 at 170 (suninia•izing these and other categoties of
"activities excluded from the term 'influencing legislation'").
2° Gaffney, .supra note 20. at 3.
27 See HOPKINS, supra note 13. § 14.4 at 394-407 (explaining the various interpretive
difficulties arising under this provision); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United
Slates, 470 17.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding revocation of the tax exemption of an
organization that did not formally endorse or oppose candidates for office. bail used pub-
lications and broadcasts to criticize incumbents and candidates. with little regard to
whether this activity took place in the context of a political campaign).
28
 See grnerally HOPKINS, supra note 13, at chap. 14.
2•
 See grrimilly a!, at § 5.2 at 131-32 & § 14.2 at 392-93.
30 78 Cong. Rec. 5861 (1934); see also id. at 5959 (statement of Senator La Follette).
51 See HOPKINS, 3Hplql note 13, § 14.2 at 392. See generally Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Hon-
ored in the Breath: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning By
Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2001).
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silent." But as Patrick O'Daniel explains in his in-depth historical ac-
count of this legislation, two things are clear: the restriction on elec-
tioneering was motivated solely by Senator Johnson's calculated effort
to protect his own political well-being, and he was not the least bit
concerned with the activities of churches." Indeed, Senator Johnson
did not hesitate to coordinate support from churches when it was to
his own political advantage:34 Thus, to the extent that greater defer-
ence is owed to legislation supported by careful deliberation and con-
sideration of its constitutionality:35' section 501(c) (3)'s lobbying and
electioneering restrictions are entitled to nothing more than the tra-
ditional deference owed to all federal statutes.
II. THE "UNSEEMLY" NATURE OF CHURCHES' INVOLVEMENT
IN POLITICS
From the vantage point of the church, the argument that the re-
strictions imposed by the tax code are justified because it is inappropri-
ate or unseemly for tax-exempt charities to engage in political activity
raises a fundamental question of inission. 36 Many churches presuma-
bly feel a substantial responsibility to obey the law, even in the form of
restrictions on their receipt of a "government benefit." Others simply
have no interest in, or in fact oppose, political involvement." Many
churches, however, doubtless feel strong pulls in the other direction
as 100 CoNG. REG. 9004 (1954) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (explaining only that the
purpose of the amendment was to 'Amy[] tax-exempt status to not Only those people who
influence legislation but also to those ;dm intervene in any political campaign on behalf of
any Ca tul Mai e For public. other ").
33 See generally.O'Dalliel, supra twirl 31.
1-1 See id.
35 See, e.g., Granlinauciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 (1989) (noting that the
Court "owe[s] some deference to Congress' judgment after it has given careful considera-
tion to the constiiu tiuuafity of a legislative provision"); Rost key v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64
(1981) (explaining that the presumption of constittuionality applies with greater force
"when ... Congress specifically col isidered the question of the Act's const it Utionality").
16 See Douglas haycock, A Sarvey of Religious Libffty in the United Stales. 47 ()trio ST. L. J.
400, 437 (1986) (observing that where "the governineut argues that die church ... is not
perfOrming a religious function lit] implicitly asserts that the government can define
the scope of the church's mission").
37 See generally Legislative Activity By Certain Types of Exempt Chganizations, Hearings &fie
the House Ways and Means Comm., 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1972) I hereinafter Legislative
Activity] (Statement of John W. Baker) ("Some religions entities believe Mat their religious
faith commits them to a complete withdrawal from the secular world. Others are com-
pelled by their faith into an active participation in nearly every aspect of that secular
world. if they arc to be good stewards of their religioits influence these people sincerely
believe they must he involved in the fOrinulatimi of public policy."),
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as well." As long as anyone can remember, churches have raised soci-
ety's consciousness regarding political issues. 39
 They comment on the
culture, rebuke its leaders, and boldly denounce its mores, as they
deem necessary.4° They have played integral roles in political struggles
over slavery,'" taxation, 42
 women's suffrage , 43
 prohibition, 44
 civil
rights,45
 war and weapons of mass destruction,46 capital punishment,47
and, perhaps most visibly in recent years, abortion: 48
Furthermore, there is no clear line between advocacy concerning
issues and advocacy concerning candidates or statutes. To he an aboli-
tionist was to advocate a change in the law on slavery. To support' civil
rights for blacks in the 1960s was to support the enactment of laws
prohibiting racial discrimination. To be a Quaker is to oppose war. As
the German theologian Johann Baptist Metz once observed, "It is int-
38 See Jodi Wilgoren, Just Befbre Election, Politics and Religion Mix Easily at a Michigan
Church, N.V. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at /123 ("There is a long and proud tradition linking poli-
tics and the black church, and never is it more apparent than on the Sunday before Elec-
tion Day, as candidates for offices large and small parade across pulpits, urging people in
yule—Tor them."); id. (noting that President Clinton sot iiiii oned 100 black ministers to the
White House "for help in getting out die vote").
39 See id. ((poling the pastor of "a church steeped in politics" as stating trout the pul-
pit: "We stand on the shoulders of forebears who stood ulr ... of forebears who weren't
afraid to challenge that which is wrung.... [Even during slavery, our forebears were still
able to say, '1 look to the hills frorn whence coutetb my help.'").
40 See Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion,
42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 8024/3 (2001) (discussing the prophetic voice of the church in light of
1 Kings 18:17).
11 See, e.g., S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 650. 699
(1972): G. BARNES, THE ANTI-SLAVERY IMPUISE, 1830-1844 (1933); Charles S. McCtiy, The
Churches and Protest Movements for Racial Justice. in RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 37, 39
(Robert Lee & Martin E. Marty eds., 1964).
42 See Gaffney, supra note 20, 01 10-11.
43
 See Barbara B. Zikumnd,
	 Arguments and iiinnen's Place in the Church, in THE
BIBLE AND SOCIAL REFORM 85-104 (Ernest R. Sandeen ed., 1082).
44 See Al usTRom, supra note 41, 01870-71.
45 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: 1 -IOW AMERICAN LAW & POLI-
TICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVO'TION 10 (1993) (noting that "the mass protest wing of the
civil rights movement ... Was openly and unashamedly religionS in its appeals as it worked
io impose its moral vision on, for example, those who would rather segregate their restau-
rants").
1° See, e.g., WAR No MORE.? OPTIONS IN NLICLF,AR ETHICS ( ,J. UralICTS ed. 1989).
17 See, e.g., DAN VAN NESS, CRIME, AND ITS VICTIMS: WIEN!' WE CAN Do (1086); CRIME
AND 'HIE RESPONSIBLE COMMUNITY (J. Stott & N. Miller eds. 1980).
48 See generallyJAmEs A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985); Gaff-
ney, supra note 20, at 9-10, 16 (observing that 'religious organizations have played a
prominent role in the debates over social issues of the highest moment," Mal "Ifirom the
lieginning of the Americmi experience there bas been a vivid connection between religion
and politics," and that there has been "a constant interaction between religion and politics
on all the large issues confronted in American politics").
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possible to privatize the eschatological promises of biblical tradition:
liberty, peace, justice, reconciliation. Again and again they force us to
assume our responsibility towards society."49 A policy statement of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) expresses a similar sentiment: "It is a
limitation and denial of faith not to seek its expression in both a per-
sonal and a public manner, in such ways as will not only influence but
transform the social order. Faith demands engagement in the secular
order and involvement in the political realm."50 In other words, for
many (if not most) people of faith, it is theologically incoherent to
require them to disconnect their faith from their political lives.
Compounding the difficulty of separating advocacy concerning
political issues from advocacy concerning candidates is the fact that
candidates conic to be known for their ideals and policy stands. hi-
deed, policy stances are sometimes identified so closely with particular
politicians that the stances take on the name of the politician.
"McCarthyism" came to represent Senator Joseph McCarthy's chilling,
anti-Communist crusades. "Reaganomics" came to represent Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan's unique brand of supply-side economics. And
more recently, "McCain-Feingold" has come to represent a particular
approach to campaign finance reform promoted by Senators John
McCain and Russ Feingold. There will accordingly be times when
there is no effective way for religious bodies to speak about political
issues they care about without expressing support for, or opposition
to, the candidates who embody positions on those issues. Although a
full discussion of the various theological views on religious involve-
ment in politics is beyond the scope of this Article, it nevertheless
seems fair to say that it makes little theological sense for churches to
cut off the most visible publicfigures—those running for public
office—from any and all expressions of support or opposition.
Churches' involvement in political activity is also consistent with
the idea that such bodies, like other voluntary associations that make
up the fabric of civil society,51 are mediating institutions that act as
" Johann Baptist Metz, The Chun* and lthrld in the Light of a "Political Theolv," in
THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD 114 (1971) (emphasis added), quoted in Gaffiley, supra note 20.
at 17.
" PRESBVITRIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), Got) ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE: A Pot.-
ICY STATEMENT Mx:1],TE') BY THE 200TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 48 (1989) I hereinafter GOD
ALONE].
51, JURGEN IIABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAAV AND DEmocAtAcx 367 (1996) ("Civil society is composed or those inure or
less spontaneously emergent associations, organizal ions, and movements that, attuned to
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buffers between individuals and the state. 52 Such institutions both in-
still a desire for civic engagement and serve as critics of the state's ex-
ercise of power. Accordingly, they stand as bulwarks against the ex-
cesses of majoritarian rule and, ultimately, strengthen our
democracy.53
 During a period in our history when disengagement
from public life is increasingly the norm, 54
 it is discouraging to think
that the state may effectively he silencing or co-opting the voice of one
of the few remaining private spheres of influence—thus eliminating
an important source of 'social capital anti a check on democratic
rule.55
 As Thomas Shaffer has expressed the point, churches "are par-
ticularly suited to notice and say that the emperor is naked." 56
Some might fear that widening the doorway to churches' in-
volvement in politics would tilt the public debate in a certain direc-
tion—skewing it, for example, either in favor of the Reverend Jesse
Jackson or those who make up the "religious right." Such concerns
seem unfounded. Churches' views on political matters, and their ap-
proach to expressing them, vary widely. Some churches believe in iso-
lating themselves from the government, other churches believe in
submitting to the government, and still other churches believe in wit-
nessing to the government. 57
 Members of the National Council of
how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres. distill and transmit such reac-
tions in amplified form to the public sphere.").
52 See EDMUND BURKE. REFLECTIONS ON TDE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 44 ( JAL Dent
ed„ 1910) (describing the "little platoons" in which people learn social obligations); Rich-
ard W. Garnett, The Story of Ilenry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression ofAssocialion, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1809-71 (2001) (discussing the mediating and values-shaping role of
religious institutions).
53 See generally ALExts DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Philips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf 10th prig. 1966) (1835); Steffen) N. Johnson, Expressive Association and Or-
ga nizational Autonomy. 85 MINN. REV. 1639, 1666-68 (2001).
51 See generally ROIIERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (describing and lamenting the decline in civic and political
engagement in America).
55
 William A. Galston, The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57 Mo. L.
REV. 236, 247 (1998) ("['There seems little doubt that [religious organizations] have fos-
tered political education and engagement to an extent few other kinds of associatiovs Call
match, at a time when most social forces are pushing toward political and civic disengage-
ment, As a general matter, then, the liberal democratic polity should not casually interfere
with organizations that don't conduct their internal affairs in conformity with broader
political norms.") (baunote ()mined).
r'6 Thomas L. Shaffer. Review Essay: Stephen Carter and Religion in A merica, 62 U. ON. E.
REV. 1601,1604 (1994) (reviewing CARTER, supra note 45).
57 See Shafler, supra tunic 56, at 1609-17 (defining three traditions: (1) "the Gathered
Church," which "teaches believers to get together and then get out of the wa)'"; (2:. "the
Church of Christendom," which "is in service to the civil order, b u t „ , need not •.corny
Aeon the state's becoming an idol, because the stale itself is Christian": and (3) "the Wit-
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Churches58 or the Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council 59 are
likely to hold views quite different from those of the United States
Catholic Conference.6° Congregations in major metropolitan areas
are likely to view political issues differently than those in rural areas,
congregations in the suburbs are likely to have a different outlook
than those in the inner city, and congregations made up of racial mi-
norities are likely to favor different policies and candidates than those
made up of whites. Thus, there is a healthy pluralism of approaches to
involvement in politics in American churches—but remarkable
agreement on the fact that faith has something to say about the poli-
cies and the people who appear on the political stage.
My own discussions with candidates confirm that churches have
widely varying degrees of comfort with engaging in political activity.
The experience of a friend who was recently a candidate for statewide
office in Illinois is illustrative. He explains that in some churches he
visited while campaigning—typically, larger, more formal congrega-
tionthose - who introduced hint would bend over backwards to insist
that his presence at their service should not be interpreted as an en-
dorsement of his candidacy. At the other end of the spectrum—typi-
cally, neighborhood-based parishes located on Chicago's South and
West sides—the leaders would put their arms around him, tell the
congregants that he was their man, and encourage them to get be-
hind him. '
In fact, some parishes relished the chance to mock the legal re-
strictions on their political campaign activities. In one parish, my
friend recounts, the pastor got up and said (paraphrased): "Now, as a
church, there are clear legal limits on our ability to endorse political
candidates, and so I want to he clear that our guest's appearance here
nessing Church," which "beads] witness to the slate on the church's terms" and "fashions
its arguments ... so that they will be heard and understood by nonbelievers as well as be-
lievers").
58 See Influencing Legislation by Public Charities, Bearing Define the House Was and Means
09ffi Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1070) (statement on behalf of the National Council of
Chun hes of Christ in the U.S.A.) (hereinafter Influencing Legislation]. For the statement of
one NCC member denomination. see Coo A ► ON ► . SUpra note 50.
See Legislative Activity, supra note 37, at 99 (statement of John W. Raker) ("Each of
the affiliates of the National ,fewish Conummity Relations Advisory Council regards its
program as an expression of the tenets of the Jewish faith which it is organized to advance.
Their activities are inspired by the Prophets' mandate to pursue justice. They believe !hat
mandate governs !their lives] in all its aspects mid requires those who adhere to the prin-
ciples,uf jtolaistu to lei their views be [tenni in support of justice for all.").
6° Sre Influencing Legislatiou, supra note 58, at 00 (siatentent of the United Stales Catho-
lic Conference).
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today must not be construed as an endorsement of his candidacy." He
then went on to say, however:
But I want you to ,know that if I could endorse a candidate,
our guest would definitely be the man I would endorse. And
it's really a shame that I can't endorse a candidate, because
he would make a tremendous leader and I'd really love to
endorse him if only I could.
One suspects that this happens—on both sides of the aisle—mot=e of-
ten than is reported.
Different churches will therefore draw different conclusions
about whether and how to participate in politics. Some oppose in-
volvement in political causes, and thus have no problem abiding by
the tax code's restrictions. Others conclude that their obligation to
obey the law warrants caution and restraint. 61 Still others will be com-
pelled by conscience to take an activist role in the political arena,
even at risk to their tax-exempt status. Regardless of how they resolve
the issue, however, those who let their religious conscience guide
their conduct are to be commended.62
 This is not to say that those
who act according to conscience will never have to "count the cost." 63
But from a theological perspective, the proper question is not only, "Is
exercising our faith in the political arena consistent with the Internal
Revenue Code?" but also, "Can the Internal Revenue Code's require-
ments for maintaining tax-exempt status be reconciled with the exer-
cise of our faith?"64
In the end, the notion that it is unseemly for churches to endorse
candidates and act as lobbyists rests on the idea that such activities are
not a legitimate part of their interests and influence. 65
 Although it
61
 CI Matthew 22:21 ("[R]ender unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God
the things that are God's.").
62 CI Acts 4:18-20 (New American Standard Version) ("And when Idle governing
authorities] had summoned [Peter and joint], they comminuted then& not to speak or
teach at all in the name of Jesus. Rut Peter and John answered and said to them, 'Whether
it is right in the sight of God to give heed to you rather than to God, you he the judge; for
we cannot stop speaking what we have seen and heard.'"); Daniel 3:8-18.
C6 Luke 14:28.
" CI JOHN COURTNEY N1URRAY Sj., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECIIONS
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION ix-x (1960) ("The question is sometimes raised, whether
Catholicism is compatible with American democracy. The question is invalid as 1%ell as
impertinent; 11w the manner of its position inverts the order of values. It must, of course,
be turned round to read, whether American democracy is compatible with Catholicism.").
c6
 Contra Legislative Minim supra note 37, at 305 (statement of J. Mott Corbett)
lust amendment guarantees of 'the free exercise' of religion should not r ermit
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does not say so explicitly, section 501(c) (3) seems to presume that
churches (along with oilier tax-exempt charities) have little to lose by
trading their ability to endorse candidates and lobby extensively for
the ability to collect tax-deductible contributions. For many churches,
that is undoubtedly true. But as Stephen Carter has stated, "If the
state is able to manipulate the content of religious doctrine through
its power to extend or deny the favored tax treatment, the religions
are already well clown the road to compromising their autonomy. "66
III. RESTRICTING THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF CHURCHES
VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PUBLIC POLICY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In light of the restrictive effect of federal tax code restrictions on
the speech and religious exercise of tax-exempt charities, one would
expect to see weighty policy justifications proffered in their support.
FeWpropositions are better established in American constitutional law
than ,the maxim that the government may not discriminate against
speech on the basis of its content. 67 Such discrimination is "presump-
tively invalid,"68 and the government bears the burden of showing
both that it is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest" and that
it is "narrowly drawn to achieve that end."60 The tax code's campaign-
ing restriction (iii contrast to the lobbying restriction) 70 clearly
amounts to content-based discrimination: it targets a narrow subset of
core political speech, and thereby insulates some of the most visible
the sfate to tell lie church when it is being 'religious' and when it is not. The church must
be perinitted to define its own goals in society in terms of die inn petal of its religious
faith. Is the Christian church somehow not being religions wlien it works on behalf of heal-
ing the sick, or for die. rights of minorities, or as peacemaker on the international scene?
No, tie chuali itself must define the perimeters of its ou treach on public polio. questions.") (empha-
sis added).
66 CARTER, ,grpra note 45, at 147.
67 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) ("It is axio-
matic that the government may not regulate speech based oil its substantive content or the
message it conveys."): (wand R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83, 391-92, 395
(1992); Sin ion & Schuster, Inc. V. Memhers of N.Y. State Crime Victinis Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
117-18 (1991); Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 90 (1972).
GP RAE, 505 U.S. at 382: accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43
(1994).
69 See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 117-18 (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project v. Rag-
land, 481 U.S. 221. 231 (1987)).
79 As discussed below, Regan v. 'Faxation with Representation, 401 U.S. 540 (1983), and
subsefittent decisions, indicate that the Court does not view the lobhying restriction as
imposing a content-based restriction on speech, See infra notes 77-86 aml accompanying
text.
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and powerful public figures from criticism. Given the Supreme
Court's expressed commitment to ensuring that "debate on p6blic
issues" is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"---even when the de-
bate involves "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials"71—those seeking to justify
the tax code's restrictions on charities' efforts to convey their moral
convictions regarding candidates for public office would seem to bear
quite a heavy burden.
At least in theory, the requirement of content neutrality applies
as fully to taxation and government benefit schemes as to other forms
of government regulation. 72
 As the Court explained in Simon & Schus-
ter, Inc. v. New York Clime Victims Board, "A statute is presumptively in-
consistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden
on speakers because of the content of their speech." 73
 The leading
Supreme Court decision in this regard is Speiser v. Randall, which held
that the state of California violated the First Amendment in denying
tax benefits to veterans who refused to foreswear advocacy of the vio-
lent overthrow of the government. 74
 In his opinion for the Court, Jus-
tice Brennan observed:
To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain,
forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.
Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine
them for this speech. The appellees are plainly mistaken in
their argument that, because a tax exemption is a "privilege".
or "bounty," its denial may not infringe speech. 75
71
 New York 'flutes v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
72 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (hulling that "the governnten I offends the First
Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content
of their expression"); accord Arkansas 1Vriters' Project, 481 U.S. at 230; FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1084); see also Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2001) (observing that government "may not design a subsidy to effect serious and
fundamental restriction on advocacy"). q Frederick Schauer, hinriples, Institutions, and the
Not Amendment, 112 11Awv. L. REV, 84, 102 (1908) ("It is, of course, unconstintlion'al for
the state Iii condition tax exempt iims, welfare. benefits, and some forms of non-policy pub-
lic employment on refraining &mu engaging in otherwise protected speech unrelated to
the purpose of the governmental program. But what looks like an unconstitutional condi-
tion from one angle may look strikingly like government speech, or government support
of its own activities and policies, from another.").
73 502 U.S. at 115.
74
 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
75 Id. at 518.
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Thug, as with other content-based restrictions, the government must
show that its "discriminatory financial treatment" of speech satisfies
strict scrutiny. 78
The Court, to some degree; backed away from Speiser in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), which unanimously
rejected free speech and equal protection challenges to the tax code's
restrictions on charities' lobbying activities." The challengers in Till?
premised their claims in part on the fact that veterans' organizations .
are exempt from the lobbying limitations to which section 501(c) (3)
organizations are subject." The Court's opinion pays lip service to the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,79 but it also contains lan-
guage suggesting that strict scrutiny is inapplicable to decisions re-
garding government benefits" absent some indication that the gov-
ernment's withholding of subsidies is "aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas."8' This aspect of the opinion is subject to question in
light of subsequent decisions. The Court has since held that a party
seeking to establish content-based discrimination need not prove an
"improper censorial motive," 82 and that the First 'Amendment bars
both "subtle" and "blatant" forms of content-based discrimination. 83
More important, however, subsequent decisions also make clear that
the Court in MR did not view the subject restrictions as involving any
content-based discrimination whatsoever. 8.1 As the Court explained in
7[i
	
Simon & Schuller, 502 U.S. at 117-18 (quoting Arkansas Wtiltas' Project, 481 U.S. at
231).
77 461 U.S. 540 (1083).
" Id. at 546.
79 Id. at 545.
SU See id. al 549 (rejecting as "not the law" the inguinent "that strict scrutiny applies
whenever Congress subsidizes sonic speech. but not all speech"); id. ("We have held in
seven)l contexts that a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental
right 'loss not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.").
$ 1 Irt, at 550.
82 See Arkansas- Writers' l'alject, 481 U.S at 228; accord Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. al 117;
Let hers v, Medlock, 499 U.S. 439.463 (1091).
83
 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (rejecting the argument that the First Amendment
bars only "ideologically driven attempts to suppress a 'm114:111;11• point of view"); KA. I<, 505
U.S. at 301-92.
SI There are sonic statements to that effect in the Court's opinion in 71VR, but they
are oblique, seem to Focus on the absence of discriminatory intent, and appeal the
equal protection portion of the Court's analysis. See 461 U.S. in 548 ("We find no indica-
tion that the mantic, was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has
had that effect. 'Fite sections of the Internal Reveime Code here al issue do not employ
any suspect classification."). As noted in the text, the absence of' discriminatory intent or
motive does not insulate content-based discrimination From challenge under the First
Amendment
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Rosenberger v. Rector of University of Virginia, "Regan relied on a distinc-
tion based on preferential treatment of certain speakers—veterans or-
ganizations—and not on a distinction based on the content or mes-
sages of those groups' speech." 85
 Viewed in that light, the restriction
on charities' campaigning activities would clearly seem to warrant
more exacting scrutiny than the Court applied in Regan, as it is
difficult to view a restriction on statements supporting or opposing
political candidates as anything other than content-based. 85
Against this backdrop, I will examine two public policy rationales
commonly offered to explain the tax code's limitations on the politi-
cal activities of charities, primarily as those limitations relate to
churches. I will focus mainly on the campaigning restriction--the
constitutionality of which has not been addressed by the Supreme
Court—which is content-based and more restrictive in scope than the
lobbying restriction.
A. The State's Interest in Avoiding Compulsory Subsidization
of Political Advocacy
One possible justification for regulating the political advocacy of
tax-exempt charitable organizations is the state's interest in not com-
pelling taxpayers to "subsidize" political speech with which they dis-
agree.87
 The notion is that politics is controversial, that each person
should be free to reach his own political conclusions, and that allow-
ing the use of tax-exempt funds for political speech would, in effect,
require taxpayers to share in the cost of advancing political views they
find objectionable. As Thomas Jefferson expressed the point, "To
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."88
Setting aside whether it makes sense to view tax exemptions for
charitable organizations as a "subsidy,"89
 the state's interest in avoid-
85
 5 1 5 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
89
 It is not my position, however, that the campaigning restriction is virupoint-based, as
the restriction applies to statements supporting or opposing candidates. 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c) (3).
ez M ichael  McConnell has described this notion as one of "political disestaldishment."
See generally Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 BYU L. REV.
405 (1986).
88
 See Everson v. Bd. of Ethic., 330 U.S. I, 28 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting
the Virginia Bill for Establishi ng Religions Freedom (1786)).
89
 For constitutional purposes, I have no quarrel with the proposition that a tax ex-
emption is a limn of "subsidy." See Regun. 461 U.S. at 544 ("Both lax exemptions and tax-
deductibility are a form of subsidy tliat is administered througli the tax system. A tax ex-
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ing compulsory financial support of political speech merits serious
consideration where a program compels support for a narrow range
of .views. In Mood v. Detroit Board of Education, for example, the Su-
preme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited a public
school teachers' union from using mandatory service fees imposed on
nonunion employees "to contribute to political candidates and to ex-
press political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative."'" The union understandably did not support a wide
range of political viewpoints, and there was no opportunity for dis-
senters to direct the relevant portion of their fees to the candidate or
expression of their choice.° Similarly, in Keller v. State Bar of Californ ia,
the Court struck clown a state bar association's use of mandatory fees
to fund its political expression.92 Here again, the organization could
emption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount a tax
it 1.vould have to pay on its income."). Bui cf Edward A. Zelinsky, Ate Tax "Benefits"fiw Relig-
ious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Bendits Jro Secular Entities?, 42 11.C. L. Rit.v. 805
(2001) ("In the final analysis, tax exemption does not subsidize churches, but leaves them
alone."); id. at 837 ("An exemption is a subsidy only if' it deviates from a normative lax
base. . . . The reflexive invocation of the 'subsidy' label, explicitly or implicitly, tints as-
sunte5 away the key issue, i.e., whether tax exemption is a proper acknowledgment of' the
sovereignty of ,,,tariz. iiimilmions. II' so, the resulting lax benefits are 1101 subsidies since
they implement, rather than deviate from, a normative lax base."). Such an understanding
of subsidies accords with the notion that the denial of a benefit may constitute a penalty.
See, e,g., Speiser, 357 U.S. at 513; Simon &' Schuster, 502 U.S. at 117-18. And what matters
most is that terms such as "snlisidy" and "exemption" are used consistently (i.e., with refer-
ence to a consistent baseline). See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Thivihgr Distinction in C0.11501.1601101 LaTe, 81 Ilmve. Ri;v. 1439 (1968).
That said, treating "exemptions" as "subsidies" has certain statist connotatkins, since it
seems to presume that everything that is not taxed is not taxed as a mailer of legislative
grace. Moreover, I question whether most Americans think of tax exemptions as subsidies,
and the Supreme Court itself has rejected the notion that a religious organization's par-
ticipation in a generally available tax exemption amounts to a "subsidy" of that organiza-
tion for Establishment Clause purposes. See Walz. v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 1, 674-75
(1970) ("Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect
economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing
them.... The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not
transifr part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the
church support the state."). Resolution of (I us issue, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
`• 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
91 Id. at 235-36. The Court's ruling also rested on its conclusion that Intich of the ex-
pressive political activity of the union was not "germane" to its purpose as exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the employees. id. at 235. This standard has proven difficult to
apply. See Lehner! v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); see also 13d. of Regents of
Univ.sif Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000) (noting the Court's "difficulties"
in determining "what expressive activity was or was not germane to the mission of the asso-
ciation").
92 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990).
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speak with just one collective voice, and compulsory funding of politi-
cal speech thus interfered with objectors' right not to speak.
The state's interest in avoiding compulsory funding of political
activities has touch less force where contributions fund not one or a
few select political viewpoints, but a wide array of speech. The Court's
decision in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. South-
worth93
 is instructive in this regard. Southworth involved a challenge to
the University of Wisconsin's collection of mandatory student activity
lees, which were used in part "to support student organizations engag-
ing in political or ideological speech."94
 Relying on the Court's deci-
sions in Keller and Abood, a group of objecting students claimed that
compelling them to support organizations whose expression was "of-
fensive to their personal beliefs" violated the First Amendment. 95
The Court disagreed. It acknowledged that many student groups
were heavily engaged in "political activity"—including activities "best
.. described as political lobbying"96—and that it would "infringe[]
on the speech and beliefs of the individual to be required ... to pay
subsidies for the objectionable speech of others without any recogni-
tion of the State's corresponding duty to hint or her."97 The manda-
tory fee, however, was administered in a viewpoint-neutral manner:
the University sought "to stimulate the whole universe of speech and
ideas."98
 Given the University's "important and substantial" interest in
"facilitating the free and open exchange of ideas,"99
 the Court held
that its constitutional duty was fully satisfied by ensuring "viewpoint
neutrality in the allocation of funding support. " 100
Viewed in light of Abood, Keller; and Sonthworth, the state's interest
in not compelling taxpayers to subsidize the political expression of
501(c) (3) corporations seems remarkably weak. Such organizations
number more than 50,000 101—indeed, churches alone presumably
account for tens of thousands of them—and they are anything but
95 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
91
 Id. at 221.
99 Id. at 227.
96 Id. at 223.
97 Id. al 231.
98
 Sow/worth, 529 U.S. at 232.
" Id. at 231, 229.
" Id. at 233.
101 See "Thx-Exempt Entities" and "Other Entities," listed tat the Exempt Organization
Business Master File, by Type or Organization and Internal Revenue Code Section, Fiscal
Years 199(i-1999, 1999 IRS DATA ROOK, available a1 htip://www.irs.gov/ prod/iax_stats/
soi/other_ia.html (File No. 9911)1327E0.XLS) (Table 26) (visited June 19, 2001) (noting
the approval of 52,773 applications !Or tax-exempt status as 501(c) (3) corporations)..
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politically homogeneous. Some are heavily Democratic; sonic are
heavily Republican; sonic are mixed. Some are vigorous advocates of
civil rights; others are vigorous advocates of lower taxes. Some are
"pro-choice"; others are "pro-life." Some are "conservative"; others are
"liberal." In other words, churches and other tax-exempt charities
represent "the whole universe of speech and ideas." 102
It follows that permitting use of tax-exempt monies for political
speech by 501(c) (3) organizations only remotely implicates First
Amendment values. Taxpayers are not being compelled to subsidize
one or a narrow range of objectionable viewpoints (as in Abood and
Keller•, but every imaginable viewpoint (as in Southworth). That is, tax-
payers are supporting tax-exempt organizations' speech in only the
most attenuated manner, and any particular organization's political
speech is not fairly attributable to the taxpayer (or the government).
This is not to say that avoidance of compulsory taxation for objection-
able political speech is an irrelevant policy consideration. But it is in-
substantial when compared with the constitutional interest in protect-
ing core political and religious speech. Accordingly, in considering
whether current law constitutes good public policy, we must look to
other policy justifications.
B. The State's Interest in Preventing Taxpayers From Deducting Contributions
to Political Candidates
A second policy justification commonly offered in support of re-
stricting churches' political activity is the state's interest in ensuring
that churches do not become conduits through which otherwise non-
deductible political contributions become deductible. The concern is
that,- if only certain entities are exempted from the tax code's restric-
tions, it becomes more difficult to enforce them. This concern may be
heightened if only churches are exempted, because the government
must draw distinctions between activities that are primarily religious
(and thus exempted) and those that are primarily political (and thus
regulated), which is no easy task. If the restrictions are not applied
evenhandedly to all tax-exempt charities, the argument goes, activities
that cannot be funded by tax-deductible contributions when carried
out by other organizations might become the primary focus of some
chuiches---thereby creating an uneven playing field and enabling
1U See Southworih, 529 U.S. at 232.
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churches to circumvent otherwise applicable taxation while function-
ing as political organizations. 103
Although this concern can be overstated, it is certainly an impor-
tant public policy consideration. 10 '1
 If a church is transformed into a
candidate's campaign headquarters (or a grass roots lobbying organi-
zation), 105
 the government has a significant interest in ensuring' that
donations to the church are taxed to the same extent as donations to
other organizations engaging in such activity. 06
 That said, however, it
is inappropriate to generalize in this regard. To cite an easy exathple,
the risk that a church's support for a candidate will undermine the
government's ability to enforce the rules on deductibility of political
contributions is much greater where the church serves as a conduit
for financial support of a candidate than where a minister merely
speaks about the moral qualifications of candidates as part of regu-
larly scheduled worship services. In other words, not all types of re-
stricted political activity pose the same threat to the government's
ability to enforce the rule that contributions to political candidates
are not tax-deductible.
10)
 A discussion of the Establishment Clause dimensions of this issue is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1087)
(holditig Iltal provisions that single nut religious entities for a special exemption or lit:twill
must relieve a In irden on religions exercise).
In Related to the government's interest in preventing deductions for contributions to
political candidates is its interest in regulating efforts to influence the political process for
private gain. This is sometimes referred to as an interest in preventing "corruption." See
generally Buckley v. Video, 424 U.S. I, 26 (1076) (discussing the state's interest in prevent-
ing corrupt km and the appearance of corruption). For example, the Supreme Cowl has
held that Congress may constitutionally regulate campaign contributions on the ['Rally
that they unduly influence politicians (and thus threaten the integrity of the democratic
process). See rd. (nb the extent that large contributions are given 10 secure a political (plid
pro (pm from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of represen-
tative democracy is undermitte(I."); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)
(expressly reaffirming Ruckity). The prospect of candidates vying for endorsements of
influential tax-exempt organizations could potentially raise similar issues. See 78 Cum:.
REC. 5861 (1034) (statement of Stn, Reed) (describing the lobbying restriction as de-
signed to restrict charitable donations "'nude to advance the personal interests of the giver
of the money," but conceding that the restriction Went "much further than the [Comnlit-
tee on Finance I intended").
I0 I Inn not suggesting that a church is not functioning as a church simply becattse it is
engaged in political activity. See AJIPM Part II. My point is simply that the church'srelig-
ion* toutirated political activities may nonetheless be subject to regulation, depending
upon the strength of the state's public policy interests.
10'-' It is established that expenditures On political activities such as lobbying are subject
to taxation in various circumstances. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 408, 512-13
(1950) (rejecting First Amen(ntent clialknige to provision disallowing the deduction of
lobbying expenditures as business expenses); cf Rockily, 424 U.S. at 26.
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I do not believe that there is always a bright line between reason-
able and unreasonable applications of the restrictions on tax-exempt
organizations' political activity. Reasonable people can disagree about
the importance of the various state interests that underpin tax and
election policy. Accordingly, I offer no definitive theory for defining
the legitimate scope of federal restrictions on churches' political ac-
tivities. Rather, I simply wish to propose a range of hypothetical cases
in hopes of shedding some light on the issues and the policy consid-
erations that inform them. Some cases are harder than others, and it
is instructive to consider what 'distinguishes the hard cases from the
easy ones.
Case One: In his weekly sermon, Pastor Christiansen of First Lutheran
Church preaches that, in God's eyes, any supposed distinction between public
and private morality is a in To illustrate, he states that in light of recently
validated reports that Governor Jones has had an extramarital affair; the Gov-
ernor is not fit to serve in public office and is unworthy of anyone's vote. Gov-
ernorJones has announced his intention to seek reelection.
Pastor Christiansen's speech presumably would fall directly
within the campaigning prohibition, which expressly bars the making
of "statements[] . . . in opposition to[] any Candidate for public
office." 107 It seems to me, however, that it would be quite unreason-
able for the IRS to attempt to revoke the Church's tax-exempt status
for this conduct. Pastor Christiansen's remarks are independent of
any organized effort to rally political opposition to the Governor.
There is no reason here to suspect that he is attempting to curry favor
with the Governor's opponent, or that he is making a calculated effort
to win influence with a candidate for private gain. Nor has the Church
expended any funds beyond what it would normally spend in con-
ducting its worship service. To be sure, Pastor Christiansen's remarks
might have an incidental effect on the voting behavior of members of
his congregation, but they are intended to illustrate a theological
point—that public and private character cannot he separated in God's
sight. •
Moreover, preaching on moral issues and critiquing the conduct
of societal leaders is part and parcel of virtually every church's pulpit
ministry, and current political events are a fertile source of relevant
sermon analogies. Indeed, there is no question that a pastor could
make the very same remarks about an unelected public official—or
even an elected official, outside of campaign season—without risk to
1 G 7 20 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994).
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the church's tax-exempt status. Nor is it illegal for churches explicitly
to address moral issues that have a clear relationship to public policy
issues, even during election years, when candidates are closely
identified with positions on such issues. Thus, to the extent that the
campaigning prohibition is concerned with preventing any use of tax-
deductible contributions that will redound to the benefit of public
officials, it is vastly underinclusive. If remarks on issues of moral Char-
acter are out of bounds simply because they are directed toward those
whose political fortune depends upon the voting public, Congress has
effectively penalized a vital part of tax-exempt churches' speech and
religious exercise. 108
Case Two: Rabbi Klein invites Mc Smith, a candidate for the United
States Senate, to address her Reformed Jewish congregation on the Sabbath. She
introduces him as "someone who has done a lot for the community" and "a
welcome antidote to the current political climate." Mr: Smith speaks about the
importance of public service and exhorts the congregation to "get involved" in
civic causes. No other candidate is given the same opportunity.
At first glance, it is not entirely clear that the synagogue here has
made a "statement" in support of Mr. Smith's candidacy. Rabbi Klein's
remark that he is a "welcome antidote" to the status quo presumably
qualifies as such a statement, but it is a less explicit endorsement than,
say, "Vote for ME Smith." Of course, it undeniably "says" something to
the synagogue's members that Mr. Smith was the only candidate in-
vited to address them, and it is difficult to view Rabbi Klein's invita-
tion as anything other than an endorsement under such circum-
stances. 109
 But it is unclear whether this means of expressing approval
of a candidate constitutes a "statement[] in support of . . . [a] candi-
date for public office" 11° within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code.
However that issue is resolved, it is important to hear in mind
that section 501(c) (3) prohibits not only "statements" supporting or
opposing political candidates, but any form of "participat[ing] in, or
interven[ing] in . any political campaign on behalf of (or in oppo-
sition to) any candidate for public office." 111
 Judged by this standard,
it is more difficult to argue that the activity here does not fall within
the campaigning prohibition. The synagogue has given Mr. Smith a
[OS
	Luke 13:32 (wherein Jesus Christ refers to King Herod as a "fox").
109
 I have elsewhere argued that holding someone out as a leader itself conveys a mes-
sage that one approves of that person's character. See Johnson, supra note 53. at 1662-64.
110 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3).
111 hl.
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platform to introduce himself and his views on involvement in public
life to a temple filled with people who could cast votes for hint. To be
sure, the synagogue's conduct falls short of distributing leaflets, put-
ting up signs, and rallying the troops to vote. But providing a forum
for a candidate to give a speech on civic issues—thereby increasing his
name recognition and raising awareness of his views—is a common
campaign strategy. The argument that this 'does not amount to "par-
ticipating" in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate is quite
unlikely to carry the day.
Whether it would be reasonable for the IRS to revoke a syna-
gogue's tax exemption on the basis of such activity is a more difficult
question. On the one hand, in contrast to Case One—in which the
pastor's remarks were an integral part of his effort to address a moral
issue and independent of any organized campaign activity—the rabbi
here coordinated the appearance of a candidate and allowed him to
deliver his OWII campaign speech. Accordingly, there is a stronger ar-
gument that the synagogue is directly engaged in a campaign to rally
political support for Mr. Smith (as opposed to an effort to address
moral issues or educate the congregation), a higher likelihood that
these efforts will influence the voting behavior of the congregation's
members, and a greater risk that the synagogue is serving as a conduit
through which otherwise nondeductible donations are being used to
assist a political candidate.
On the other hand, the synagogue has not spent any funds be-
yond what it would ordinarily spend in conducting its normal worship
service. Nor has it taken steps to coordinate activities such as pant-
phleting or canvassing of neighborhoods to generate support for Mr.
Smith. The possibility that inviting a candidate to speak at a service
itself amounts to an illicit effort to circumvent the nondeductibility of
contributions to political campaigns seems fairly remote. Moreover, as
a rule of thumb, houses of worship are more likely to be affected by
the decisions of local officials than by politicians who make policy on
a national (and international) scale. Had Rabbi Klein shared the lec-
tern with a candidate for the local zoning board during the pendency
of the synagogue's application to expand its parking lot, there would
he greater cause for concern that it was involved in an improper at-
tempt to influence policy for private gain.
Case Three: An independent, community-oriented congregation in the .
inner city believes that God has called it to combat poverty and crime in its
midst. Accordingly, the church regularly supports public policy initiatives de-
signed to improve lye in the inner city, prepares pamphlets highlighting which
political candidates hold policy positions consistent with those of the church,
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and invites candidates who share its commitments to address the congregation
on Sunday mornings. Members and leaders of the congregation regularly cam-
paign for these officials, using the church as the base for efforts including calls
to voters and distributing signs and pamphlets to homes throughout the neigh-
borhood.
Case Three presents the strongest case for applying the .cam-
paigning restriction. The church essentially uses the promise of direct
political support to influence potential office-holders to adopt poli-
cies that benefit the church's constituency. Select candidates who
hold certain policy positions receive favored treatment in the church's
literature and may address the congregation at worship services.' The
church spends tax-deductible' donations to support the direct cam-
paigning efforts of these candidates. In sum, the church's efforts di-
rectly influence voting behavior, it spends more than incidental
amounts of tax-exempt donations directly on campaigns, and there is
a substantial possibility that candidates will be influenced to adopt
policy positions different from those that they would otherwise adopt
for fear of losing the church's support.
Here too, however, there are arguments on both sides. Even as-
suming the church uses its influence in an effort to convince political
leaders to adopt policies that aid the poor hi their community, this is
not the prototypical "quid pro quo"—political support in exchange
for aid to the poor—that one normally associates with improper ef-
forts to influence policymakers for private gailL112
 Nor does this hypo-
thetical present a case in which the church has ceased to function as a
church. To be sure, it is engaged in what the law understandably re-
gards as substantial campaign activity. But efforts to help the poor are
also a foundational part of Christian ministry," 3
 and churches have a
strong constitutional interest in exercising their faith in that arena.'"
If churches must suffer the loss of their tax-exempt status on account
of their concerted political efforts to aid the disadvantaged, that con-
stitutes a substantial penalty on their religious exercise. This is not to
say that the state lacks an important interest in ensuring that all -end-
112 See llitekkv, 424 U.S. at 26 (expressing concern regarding the existence of 'large
contributions ... given to secatre at political {paid pm quo from current and potent ial . office
holders ....").
113 See, e.g., Mark 10:17-23; Isaiah 61:1-3.
114 Cf. Good News Club v. Milfbrd Cent. Sch., 121 S. Cc. 2093, 2099 (2001) ("We dis-
agree that soinething that is 'quintessentially religious' or 'decidedly religious in nature'
cannot also be characterized properly as the leaching of morals and character develop-
ment from a partictalar viewpoint." (emphasis added)).
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ties that function as political organizations are equally subject to taxa-
tion: ,My point is simply that there are substantial constitutional inter-
ests ;an the other side of the scale warranting consideration.
In sum, wherever one draws the line, these hypothetical cases
demonstrate that insofar as the government is concerned with pre-
serving its ability to prevent tax deductions for political contributions,
its interest in imposing the restrictions of section 501(c) (3) on
churches varies with the circumstances. Some efforts that presumably
fall directly within the campaigning prohibition are inextricably inter-
twined with a church's efforts to address moral issues and involve no
expenditures beyond those needed to provide that church's normal
array of services, Given that these efforts often represent a vital part of
a church's constitutionally protected speech and religious exercise, a
narrowing construction of the prohibition is warranted in at least
these circumstances."'
Perhaps the IRS is aware that enforcement of the campaigning
restriction in certain cases could unjustifiably interfere with constitu-
tionally protected activity. There are few reported decisions in this
area, and those that exist involve somewhat atypical facts. 116 That said, '
the IRS's approach to enforcement raises other concerns. Many
churches simply ignore the campaigning prohibition precisely be-
cause it is so rarely enforced. Other churches, by contrast, are always
looking over their shoulder, for fear that any political activity will
place them in violation of the Code and at risk of losing their tax-
exempt status. 117 The restriction thus has an in terrorent effect, and the
IRS's tack of enforcement creates a tremendous disparity between
churches who take the requirement seriously and those who think it is
It merits reemphasis that however great the governmeni's interest in requiring tax-
exempt churches io refrain from campaigning—an issue, I have noted, about which peo-
ple can reasonably disagree—the basis for that interest cannot he that churches have no
kgitimate interest iu participating in die political process. See supra Parr II mid accompany-
ing text; see also Garnett. super now 40, at 783-93 (arguing that it is nut within the compe-
tence of government to define the proper scope of the religions sphere). Rather, the gov-
ernmenes iniewst in regulating the political campaign aclivily of churches is valid only to
the extent that it applies to all tax-exempt entities that engage in such activity.
116 See Branch Ministries v. Rossoui, 211 V.341 137 (I).C. Cir. 2000) (upholding revoca-
tion of the tax exemption of a church that placed hill-page mlveriisements in USA Today
and the Washington Times urging opposiiion to then-Governor Bill Clinton's presidential
candiilacy and soliciting contributions for ['miller atIvertisements); Christian Echoes Nat'l
Nlinisiry. Inc. v. United States. 470 F.2d 849-(10th Cir. 1072) (upholding revocation of the
tax exemption of au organization that used broadcasts to criticize incumbents and candi-
dates).
" 7 See Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Searrh of a Rationale: Mat the Tax Code Prohibits;
117,y; 7/.1 Mat Endr 42 B.C. L. REV. 903. 928-20 (2001).
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a joke. The remedy for this, of course, is not overactive enforcement
of the restriction but rather clarification of the law to indicate what
sorts of activities are likely to put a church's tax exemption at risk.
Given the "all or nothing" quality of the campaigning restric-
tion—the prohibition is absolute, and the penalty for its violation is
revocation of tax-exempt status—Congress would also be well advised
to consider whether a less drastic sanction might just as well serve the
restriction's purpose. In the private inurement context, Congress re-
cently adopted a provision under which the remedy for violating the
prohibition on "excess benefit transactions"—transactions that unrea-
sonably benefit directors; employees, or other persons who exercise
control over the organizationns—need not he a loss of tax-exempt
status, but rather a requirement that the money be repaid to the or-
ganization as well as payment of taxes on the amount of the excess
benefit."° The provision, known as the "intermediate sanctions"
rule, 12° reflects the fact that many violations of the prohibition are
isolated and do not indicate that an organization has ceased to func-
tion as a bona fide charity. 121
 Congress understandably determined
that it may be appropriate to penalize only those who are responsible
for engaging in excess benefit transactions, rather than the entity as a
whole and its supporters. Insofar as the same considerations apply to
enforcement of the campaigning restriction, this approach deserves
consideration in that setting as well.
CONCLUSION
Few subjects give rise to deeply held opinions and strong emo-
tions as well as politics and religion. Both topics are personal, both
are controversial, both involve powerful claims for allegiance, both
involve value judgments, both involve efforts to persuade others of
118 An "excess benefit transaction" is one ill which a tax-exempt corporation provides
an economic benefit for the use of certain "disqualified persons." such as those who lire
(or recently were) "in a position to exercise substantial influence over the organization."
.See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (1994).
lig Id.
120 See generally Excise Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions, 66 Fed. Reg. 2144, 2155
(Jan. 10, 2001).
121 1.1.R. Rio'. No. 104-506, at 59 n.15 (1996) ("In general, the intermediate sanctions
are the sole sanction imposed in those cases in which the excess benefit does not rise to a
level where it calls into question whether, on the whole, the organization functions as a
charitable or other tax-exempt organization. In practice, revocation of tax-exempt Fiat us,
with or without the imposition of excise taxes, would occur only when the organization no
longer operates as a charitable organization.").
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one's view, and both have a profound effect on society. It should thus
come as little surprise that when politics and religion mix, it often
causes a stir.
From the standpoint of the church, the degree to which it is ap-
prop:•/ ale for religion and politics to mix raises a fundamental question
of mission. Different churches will answer this question in different
ways, but those that treat it as a matter of religious conscience are to
he commended.
From the standpoint of public policy and constitutional law, the
extent to which the state may regulate churches' participation in poli-
tics simply depends upon the strength of its public policy interests. I
have focused on two policy justifications commonly offered to support
current restrictions on 501(c) (3) corporations: the government's in-
terest in not compelling taxpayers to subsidize objectionable political
speech, and its interest in preserving its ability to prevent tax deduc-
tions for contributions to political candidates. In my view, the former
justification is insignificant while the latter is more substantial. Given
the significant speech and free exercise interests on the other side of
the scale, however, appropriate respect for those constitutional inter-
ests warrants a narrowing construction of the restrictions in certain
circumstances.
